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Abstract
Technological change has been notable in recent decades, including the field of as-
sistive technologies aimed at promoting the autonomy of the elderly and disabled 
people. Personal autonomy is possible thanks to ethical-juridical protection through 
reciprocally recognized human rights (civil and political, economic, social and cultur-
al, third generation). The current technological change could produce an alteration 
in the exercise of personal autonomy, putting at risk its normative protection, since 
some of these rights currently require technological mediations to be able to be car-
ried out. Nowadays, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) governs as the international normative framework that defines and protects 
the autonomy of people with disabilities, mostly elderly, and includes important ref-
erences to technological developments. New assistive technologies, that can be used 
to record physiological variables or to monitor habitual patterns of life, are suggested 
as devices that promote personal autonomy. Health monitoring could impact privacy, 
identity, integrity, and the protection of personal data. Therefore, it is necessary to 
broaden the ethical reflection from the CRPD to the relevant regulations on privacy 
and data protection (General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] and Draft Privacy 
Regulation ePrivacy) and the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) provided in 
Art. 35 GDPR, which is especially relevant for the realm of assistive technologies. In 
this contribution we show how technological change affects some aspects of personal 
autonomy, its normative protection, privacy, and care.
12.1 Introduction
In recent years, technological change has been notable, including the field of assis-
tive technologies aimed at promoting the autonomy of elderly and disabled persons. 
In this contribution we show how this change affects some aspects of personal auton-
omy, its normative protection, privacy, and care.
Taken as the possibility of self-government, without illegitimate interference, to 
decide on and execute one’s life plan, personal autonomy is possible thanks to ethi-
cal-juridical protection and through reciprocally recognized human rights (civil and 
political, economic, social and cultural, third generation, corresponding primarily to 
rights of a collective nature: rights to a healthy environment, economic development, 
self-determination). The current technological change could produce an alteration 
in the exercise of personal autonomy, putting at risk its normative protection, since 
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carrying out some of these rights has followed a constant process of increasing need 
and dependence on technological mediations (Winner 2007). Nevertheless, the el-
derly and disabled have been absent from these reflections over time, assuming their 
limited ability to exercise autonomy. Nowadays, fortunately, the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (CRPD) (UN 2006) governs as the international 
normative framework that defines and protects the autonomy of people with disabili-
ties, with the highest rates of disability among the elderly resulting from the accumu-
lation of health risks over a lifetime of illness, injury and chronic illness, and includes 
important references to technological developments(see, for example, CRPD, arts. 2, 
4 g, 4 h, 9, 20b, 20 d, 21a, 26.3, 29a.ii).
New assistive technologies, such as robot companions, smart screen assistants, 
or wearable technology with sensors that record physiological variables to monitor 
habitual patterns of life, are suggested as devices that promote personal autonomy. 
The recorded data, once processed, can offer information about health, habits, etc., 
and allow, in principle, to make more autonomous decisions about one’s own well-be-
ing and quality of life, relying on the information provided by the processing of data 
obtained from personal patterns of behavior. But this technological scenario claims 
an extreme protection of personal autonomy too, since health monitoring could im-
pact privacy, identity, integrity, and the protection of personal data. Therefore, it is 
necessary to broaden the ethical reflection: from the CRPD to the relevant regulations 
on privacy and data protection (General Data Protection Regulation [GDPR] and Draft 
Privacy Regulation ePrivacy) and the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) pro-
vided in art. 35 GDPR, which is especially relevant for the realm of assistive technol-
ogies. All these regulations have the essential goal to protect the affected individuals 
in the asymmetric power relations which they face with the organizations and gov-
ernments that develop, implement, and manage assistive technologies. In this kind 
of relationship, it seems especially important to ensure the effective protection of the 
personal autonomy of the elderly and disabled.
The technological scenario, which affects rights such as privacy, identity, integ-
rity, and data protection, requires new forms of “care”. Not only traditional forms of 
personal and intersubjective care, but also social care, that is, normative measures 
that help secure those rights, so that new technological devices do not become instru-
ments of surveillance and control, diminishing the autonomy they intend to promote. 
The basic ethical principle of non-maleficence involves the need to protect people 
from damage and harm in her interaction with assistive technologies. As in the case 
of medical iatrogenesis, the technological mediations could cause harms (on the peo-
ple’s privacy, identity, and integrity). This is the primary ethical duty about the use 
of assistive technologies: primum non nocere. Moreover, these technologies should be 
available without any kind of discrimination in order to fulfill an elemental ethical 
principle of justice.
To achieve this goal it is important to consider the “public” dimension of auton-
omy and its relational character, related to the social participation of the elderly and 
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disabled in the public debate on assistive technologies, in all phases of their develop-
ment, in terms of “social appropriation” of technologies or inclusiveness. Autonomy 
should be considered in an intersubjective and collaborative way instead of an indi-
vidualistic and solipsistic one.
12.2 Technological mediation and the capability approach
Generally speaking, a community’s approach and relationship to a certain technol-
ogy can be viewed as mediated and filled with meaning by means of intertwining 
sets of values, representations and social practices. This way of understanding the 
relationship allows us to talk about the community’s “discourse” (Lynch 1988) about 
this technology. But there is an analogous (instrumental) discourse (Winner 1980), 
linked to the whole set of characteristics of the technology in question, which also 
brings with it practices, representations and values coming from the communities 
responsible for its idea, design, development, manufacturing, marketing and com-
mercialization.
Different environments for activities and social participation, such as: urban, 
domestic, educational or work environments; environments for public, political, so-
cial and economic participation; or environments for culture, leisure or health can be 
considered “functionings environments,” in the sense of the capability approach de-
veloped by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. This concept deals with spaces (real 
or virtual) in which we carry out actions and practices we consider to be important 
and valuable for our well-being and quality of life (Sen and Nussbaum 1993). In this 
approach, well-being consists of evaluating life conditions defined by functionings. 
These represent what a person achieves or becomes in the course of their life, which 
can be considered a set of interrelated functionings (Sen 1987, 1998).
The introduction of technological elements into functionings environments con-
dition the way in which these actions are carried out and, consequently, can modify 
the evaluation of the functionings mediated by such elements (Toboso 2010). If in a 
given environment the situation arises in which mediation from a device is obligato-
rily needed to perform a certain functioning, the limitations of this device will define 
the limitations of this act. In the most extreme case, if the device is not available, 
the performance of the functioning will be nullified, which will negatively affect the 
scope of well-being associated with its achievement. Barriers of access or use will cre-
ate discrimination and inequality in the user communities, as a consequence of their 
technological dependence on such devices. The sum of inequalities of access and use 
may produce an inequality of greater importance: an inequality of opportunities for 
the affected people or communities, as a consequence of such barriers that restrict the 
opportunities to access the use of technologies (Toboso 2010).
Demanding genuine equal opportunities brings up important questions related 
to ethics, politics and social justice, and to the question which value frameworks 
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should be considered the most relevant when considering what is needed for equality. 
The aspects that a community of users can evaluate in their relationship with any type 
of device are numerous. Among them we highlight some values (Echeverría 2003), 
in connection with access and use, and linked to security and privacy: availability, 
affordability, necessity, appearance, simplicity, ergonomics, accessibility, usability, 
versatility, efficiency, quality, reliability, security, intimacy and privacy.
The realization of values, such as those referred to, can be interpreted as the con-
currence of the community’s discourse and the instrumental discourse, and is the ba-
sic condition for “social appropriation” of the devices, which we should differentiate 
from the simple concept of “adopting” them (Salovaara and Tamminen 2009). Adop-
tion happens through the practice of use, while appropriation happens by means 
of the co-constructive combination of practices and values, requiring realization of 
these values in practices, and also involves social representations that are favorable 
towards the device in question (Tiles and Oberdiek,1995; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005).
12.3  Current frameworks on the rights of the elderly  
and persons with disabilities
More than mere instruments, assistive technologies are mediations which open up 
new possibilities in human functioning. Today, numerous functionings are mediat-
ed by them. In the environments in which people who are dependent, the elderly 
or those with disabilities are cared for, the introduction of assistive technologies is 
generally encouraged as a substitute for traditional human care (de Asís Roig 2014). 
Resorting to these devices should contribute to a “democratization of care” (Tronto 
2013), that overcomes the enormous gender bias that has befallen this fundamental 
activity for social reproduction (Kittay 1999), and should not be a source of new dis-
crimination regarding access to basic care and attention.
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is an interna-
tional regulatory framework with legal repercussions in the majority of countries 
in the world. To responsibly advance the development of assistive technologies, in 
terms of well-being and justice, professionals involved should receive training in this 
legal document, given the importance socio-technical mediations have for the full 
enjoyment of human rights (Winner 2007). This technological development will have 
to take into account the regulatory framework of the CRPD, and prospectively orient 
itself towards facilitating autonomy in the achievement of human functionings in in-
clusive environments, guaranteeing conditions for good care, derived from an inter-
national human rights normative framework.
With respect to the values in the CRPD to be taken into account in developing 
assistive technologies, we point out the following: (1) Respect for every type of human 
functional diversity. Technologically assisted care must deal with the wide diversity 
of human functionings. (2) Inclusion requires universal accessibility and universal 
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design. Assistive technologies must be accessible and promote, in addition to health, 
autonomy and social inclusion. (3) Social participation of people receiving assistance 
demands having a voice in all the phases of development and implementation of tech-
nologies. It is necessary to include these people from the first developmental phases 
of technological innovation (Chavarriaga and Millán 2016), in consonance with what 
is indicated in the CRPD (Preamble, Parts n and o, Art. 3.c). The importance of partic-
ipation in the technological design process on the part of users with disability must 
be emphasized. The users themselves know best how technological devices can con-
tribute to their greater autonomy, quality of life and level of participation in society, 
and can assist in evaluating their advantages as well as their drawbacks in the earliest 
phases of their development. As the ones most familiar with their own reality, users 
help to create technological solutions that are more feasible in not only their technical 
but also their financial and social aspects. User participation also contributes to gen-
erating demand for those solutions which, in turn, stimulates their introduction into 
the market and inspires new lines of research (Toboso 2010).
The underlying theoretical discourse of the CRPD, based on the social model of 
disability (Abberley 1987; Barnes, Oliver and Barton 2002; Swain et al. 2004), inter-
prets disability as a result of the interaction between people with different bodily or 
mental functions and discriminatory social structures. The juridical-moral approach 
of the CRPD endorses overcoming the traditional medical-rehabilitation model, 
which limits disability to the individual sphere, and highlights society’s responsibil-
ity to eliminate all social barriers – physical, legal, political, economic, cultural or 
attitudinal – that affect persons with disabilities. Accordingly, in the Preamble (sec-
tion 5) the CRPD states that “disability is an evolving concept” and that “disability 
results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and 
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on 
an equal basis with others”.
Hence, speaking about “disability” and “persons with disability” we should 
henceforth consider that the current recognized normative framework is the CRPD 
and no longer about considering disability as conceived in the medical-rehabilitator 
model, even though it is still present to a large extent in the collective imagination 
and societal practices (UN 2006). As such, it should be concluded that implementa-
tion of socially appropriable assistive technologies must take into consideration the 
model underlying the CRPD.
12.4  Rethinking autonomy in technological functionings  
environments
According to what is expressed in Article 20.b, the CRPD recognises the right to have 
access to “assistive technologies, technical devices and quality mobility aids, includ-
ing by making them available at affordable cost”. Articles 4.g and 26.3 also call on the 
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States Parties to promote assistive technologies and devices for people with disabili-
ties “as they relate to habilitation and rehabilitation”. Nevertheless, the proclamation 
of such rights does not imply a relapse into traditional medical-rehabilitation model 
outlined above. Consequently, although assistive technologies may be focused on re-
habilitation or assistance, they must be oriented, in accordance with the principles 
of the CRPD, towards the respect for and facilitation of individual autonomy (Art. 3a) 
in the usual spaces for activity and social participation of persons with disabilities 
(Art. 3c), and in concordance with the other relevant principles: dignity, non-dis-
crimination, equality of opportunity, respect for differences, accessibility, equality 
between men and women, and respect for the evolving capacities of children with 
disabilities (Art. 3).
Assistive technologies are also used to improve the functional autonomy of peo-
ple with some types of motor disorder or neurodevelopmental disorder. Some appli-
cations based on brain-machine interfaces allow motor pathologies to be restored, 
and to restore communication through writing on a computer screen (Hochberg et al. 
2006) or as a physical response to control an effector (Wodlinger et al. 2015). Other ap-
plications that have been used for decades are stimulation interfaces such as cochlear 
implants (Gifford et al. 2008) and deep brain stimulation, which relieves symptoms 
for people with Parkinson’s disease, dystonia (Arle and Alterman 1999) or depression 
(Trapp, Xiong and Conway 2018).
These techno-scientific artefacts require an ethical examination (Jonas 1997) that 
clarifies the risks involved in their use, determines morally acceptable conditions for 
their adaptation and helps to increase the level of commitment for responsible perfor-
mance in techno-scientific work by designers and developers in the social framework 
(Agazzi 1996). Any reflection concerning change in the technological area should be 
accompanied by a parallel ethical reflection on the aspects affected by these technol-
ogies. Given the large amount of possibilities to use current technology, such a change 
creates the obligation to deal with important questions such as autonomy, privacy and 
data protection, as well as the new neurorights (see below) and cognitive liberty. The 
adoption of an ethical-legal framework should be aimed at providing technologies 
to support the autonomy of persons with disabilities. Moreover, it should guide tech-
no-scientific work towards the purpose society as a whole should be committed: the 
inclusion of persons with disabilities into a variety of different social environments.
The change in discourse the CRPD has brought about allows the ideas of care, 
autonomy, dependence and vulnerability to be redefined. Care is now conceived as a 
right that is, in turn, reinforced by the set of rights promoted by the Convention and 
by technological mediation. Thus, what is stressed is a “public” vision of care, as op-
posed to another traditional vision that is benevolent and with an enormous gender 
bias (see Kittay 1999). Limitations on personal autonomy in dependent people are no 
longer conceived as pure destiny or as an inherent characteristic of these limitations, 
but rather as a contextual condition that can be modified or is the focus of attention in 
the framework of human rights. Furthermore dependence, as a situation that requires 
12.4 Rethinking autonomy in technological functionings environments   191
care, is no longer conceived apart from the possibility of an independent life. There is 
also a growing awareness that physical or mental vulnerability interacts with social 
vulnerability which in turn results from stigmatization and from the discriminatory 
configuration of the socio-technological environment (Nussbaum 2007).
Some implications of this conceptual redefinition for assistive technologies are: 
(1) The technologies in question need to contribute to improving the social task of 
caregiving; (2) They need to facilitate the autonomy of people receiving assistance in 
the social environments in which they develop; and (3) They need to be part of the 
socio-technological foundation that supports their rights as a whole.
12.4.1 Privacy and data protection
We begin by recalling an essential principle of privacy in continental Europe, starting 
from legislation on the subject in 1970 s Germany. This principle is called prohibition 
with the exception of authorization (Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt). This means that 
processing of personal data is prohibited unless there is an exception that authorises 
data processing. The traditional examples were that the affected person had given 
their consent or that a legal regulation authorized the data processing.
The GDPR (in Art.6.1.f) has introduced or extended the possibility of arguing for a 
legitimate interest on the part of the organization that is processing personal data. It 
is worth pointing out that it is necessary to be able to clearly document the existence 
of this interest, as well as that it does not imply a disproportionate risk to the rights 
of the people affected. If this documentation is impossible, it is likely that from the 
start of its implementation the processing implies a violation of privacy legislation. 
The point of this clause is to show that control regarding the subject of privacy should 
be done prior to implementation—in fact even prior to doing any test with real data or 
real subjects who will be affected by an assistive technology.
12.4.2 Data protection targets
To reflect on the essential points regarding privacy, we draw upon what are known as 
safety goals (in German, in the original: Schutzziele, Rost Op. Cit).
 – Transparency. In the field of privacy, this concept (included in arts. 5, 25 and 32 
of the GDPR) is understood as the possibility to control (from the point of view of 
those responsible for processing, as well as from the perspective of the subjects 
affected and from an external body such as a data protection authority) any pro-
cessing of personal data. This control is usually guaranteed by means of docu-
mentation and different types of protocols.
 – Unlinkability. Included, among others, in the GDPR articles mentioned above, 
this implies that in regard to privacy, personal data collection must be intended 
192  12 Personal autonomy in elderly and disabled: How assistive technologies impact on it 
for specified purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible 
with these purposes. To be able to fulfill this goal, it is essential that the purpose 
of the processing is defined as precisely as possible, guaranteeing its legitimacy 
and legality.
 – Integrity. (see GDPR articles mentioned above) This refers, on the one hand, to 
the requirement that information technology processes and systems continuous-
ly comply with the specifications that have been determined for the execution of 
their intended functions. On the other hand, integrity means that the data to be 
processed remain intact, complete, and up-to-date. Deviations from these prop-
erties must be excluded or at least ascertainable so that this can either be taken 
into consideration or the data can be corrected.
 – Confidentiality. (Ibid.) This is guaranteed in the sense of the principle of Privacy 
by Design (Art. 24 GDPR), when processing of personal data has been planned 
and implemented in such a way that only authorized people can access the func-
tions (this is a technical term, we may also write procedures) and systems related 
to it.
 – Ability to intervene. In addition to the previously mentioned articles, arts. 18, 20 
and 21 of the GDPR should also be noted. In regard to privacy, this implies that the 
processing of  personal data, if necessary, can be modified or stopped.
 – Availability. (see arts. 13 and 15 of the GDPR, among others). This is the require-
ment that personal data must be available and can be used properly in the in-
tended process. Thus, the data must be accessible to authorized parties and the 
methods intended for their processing must be applied.
The data protection goals mentioned here establish a list of criteria to follow for the 
development and implementation of personal data processing that is easily interpre-
table, including for the use of assistive technologies, without delving too deeply into 
the legal aspects of the problems that may arise if the data protection goals are not 
implemented/respected (e. g. lack of confidentiality). Also implied is the possibility of 
implementing a control procedure that follows the principles in the PDCA cycle (Plan, 
Do, Check, Act) (Breut, 2017 Op. Cit) that allow regular controls to be done, in fact 
continually, on the processing that is developed and implemented.
12.4.3 Data protection impact assessment
Article 35 of the GDPR establishes that given the probability that processing “is likely 
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”, it will be nec-
essary to carry out a DPIA before the processing is started. This obligation is aligned 
with the principle of privacy, which has the goal of analyzing processing from its de-
sign phase onwards and of guaranteeing proper management of the risks as well as 
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the fulfillment of the principles of necessity and proportionality. A DPIA should in-
clude:
 – a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations
 – an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations 
in relation to the purposes
 – an assessment of the risks
 – the envisaged measures to address the risks, including safeguards, security mea-
sures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data.
It should be highlighted some types of personal data processing can involve high 
risks for the subjects affected and as such need a DPIA. The Article 29 working par-
ty (Art. 29 WP) was the independent European working party that dealt with issues 
relating to the protection of privacy and personal data until 25 May 2018 (after entry 
into application of the GDPR its new name is European Data Protection Board) issued 
a document in respect to this (European Commission 2017) in which they mention 
different criteria to follow in order to assess the risks involved with regard to certain 
forms of personal data processing. In the following we mention two that are relevant 
for assistive technologies:
 – “A systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural 
persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on 
which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural per-
son or similarly significantly affect the natural person” (Art. 35. 3 GDPR)
 – Processing on a large scale of special categories of data referred to in Article 9, 
section 1, or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences re-
ferred to in Article 10.
It should be remembered that found among the types of data mentioned in Article 9.1 
of the GDPR are data concerning health. The two points mentioned above indicate 
that any  processing of personal data in which assistive technologies are used should 
be accompanied by a DPIA. Carrying out this assessment forms part of the legal basis 
for development and implementation of the processing, and not completing the as-
sessment could imply that this processing constitutes, or could constitute, from the 
moment real personal data is utilized, a violation of current legislation on the subject 
of data protection.
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12.5  On the recognition of new human rights:  
‛Neurorights’ and cognitive liberty
The first step towards possible recognition of new human rights related to neurosci-
ence take form in the debate on “cognitive liberty”. According to Bublitz (2013), this 
concept, at times also called “mental self-determination”, includes two closely-relat-
ed aspects:
 – The right of individuals to use emerging neurotechnologies
 – The protection of individuals against coercive use of these technologies and the 
possibility that the technology could be used without their consent.
Bublitz (2013) summarizes this in the following manner: cognitive liberty is the princi-
ple that guarantees “the right to alter one’s mental states with the help of neurotools 
as well as to refuse to do so”. The second aspect of cognitive liberty is related to a 
reconceptualization of some already existing rights and to the creation of new funda-
mental “neurorights” (Ienca and Andorno 2017):
 – The right to mental privacy
 – The right to mental integrity
 – The right to psychological continuity.
12.5.1 The right to mental privacy
If we consider the problems posed to reach adequate protection of the traditional 
right to privacy, it appears evident that it is necessary to adapt regulations to achieve 
the same type of protection for mental privacy. This protection should cover any type 
of information obtained from the brain by means of neurotechnologies and distrib-
uted by digital means. It means protecting people in the face of illegitimate use of for 
example their cerebral information and preventing possible filtrations of this data on 
the Internet.
12.5.2 The right to mental integrity
Intrusions or actions on a person’s brain can create not only a violation of their pri-
vacy but also a damaging change to their neural computation. The presence of dam-
age is a necessary condition for a violation of the mental integrity of the person to 
have taken place. Ienca and Haselager (2016) have introduced the idea of “malicious 
brain-hacking” to describe neurocriminal activities on the neural computation of 
users of neurotechnologies, just like what hackers do with computers. Focusing on 
brain-computer interface (BCI), which could also be used in conjunction with assis-
tive technologies, they have identified four types of malicious brain-hacking on dif-
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ferent levels or for different types of BCI. In three of these types the attack is done on 
the measurement, decoding and feedback levels and can cause manipulation of the 
person’s neural computation if the attacker, without authorization or knowledge of 
the person, intercepts the signal sent by the BCI-controlled apparatus.
The rights that should arise from this new scenario must be the basis for a new 
regulation that provides adequate protection in the face of aggressions by means of 
neurotechnologies. The incorporation of neurotechnologies into the digital world and 
availability on the Internet of the information created can cause the mental integrity 
of the individuals to be subject to a higher level of risk if the appropriate protective 
measures have not been adopted.
12.5.3 The right to psychological continuity
In addition to mental privacy and mental integrity, the perception that an individual 
has of their own identity may also be affected by an incorrect use of neurotechnolo-
gies. These technologies can be used to monitor brain signals as well as to stimulate 
or modulate brain functions. As such, changes in brain functions produced by brain 
stimulation can, as a consequence, create changes in critical mental states for the 
personality (Decker and Fleischer 2008). Specifically, it has been observed that brain 
stimulation can have an impact on psychological continuity, that is to say, on the 
essential requirement for personal identity to perceive oneself as a continuous and 
persistent entity, and “as the same person”, over time (Klaming and Haselager 2013).
This right implies protecting the personal identity and continuity of personal be-
havior in the face of non-consensual modifications by third parties. This is closely 
related to the right to mental integrity and, at times, they might overlap as both rights 
seek to protect individuals from non-consensual alterations of their mental dimen-
sion.
The subject of new fundamental neurorights has not been picked up, for the mo-
ment, in regulation or legislation, but we believe it should be taken into account as 
soon as possible in the development and implementation of neurotechnologies such 
as BCIs in order to be able to analyze and manage risks as comprehensively as possi-
ble.
12.6 Conclusions
The mediation of technological devices, such as assistive technologies, in function-
ings environments determine the character of the assisted functionings and the way 
they are carried out. This involves modification of the original functionings, which 
will transform into “mediated” ones. In general, this mediation implies adaptation of 
the users’ discourse to the artefactual discourse materialized in the devices (Winner 
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2007), which produces a transformation not only in the landscape of practices in the 
environment, but also in the panorama of its values.
More than one hundred years ago, Schumpeter spoke about processes for inno-
vation as “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1934). Recently, Javier Echeverría has 
been reflecting on the good and bad of innovation, assuming that all innovation has 
its beneficiaries but also those who are harmed (Echeverría 2014). The question that 
concerns us is how to distribute the benefits and the harms. It would be desirable for 
this to be done in a just and equitable way toward the conditions of functionings envi-
ronments, on which the well-being and quality of life of people may critically depend.
In caregiving environments, the supposed advantages of new assistive technol-
ogies such as affective robots, robotic assistants, caregiving robots and others are 
already being advertised. But this is being done without taking into account that 
caregiving relationships imply elements that are essentially human and intrinsically 
intersubjective, and to care for a person with Alzheimer’s, to name one case, the best 
“technology” is another human being (de Asís Roig 2014). As we indicated in the In-
troduction, the current technological scenario affects rights such as privacy, identity, 
integrity and data protection, and requires new forms of care. In addition to tradition-
al and familiar personal care, appealing to normative measures, such as the CRPD, 
which help to guarantee these rights, we also raise the need for social care, which as-
sumes the importance of the public dimension of autonomy, related to the social par-
ticipation of older and disabled people in the public debate on assistive technologies. 
The last threshold is the prevention of harm and damage (by action or by omission) 
involved in the ethical principle of non-maleficence (primun non nocere). We should 
avoid the adverse effects of assistive technologies in elderly autonomy, identity, and 
integrity as a case of “iatrogenesis” by means of a social and participative appropria-
tion of that device.
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